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Abstract—Software systems contain resilience code to handle
those failures and unexpected events happening in production. It
is essential for developers to understand and assess the resilience
of their systems. Chaos engineering is a technology that aims
at assessing resilience and uncovering weaknesses by actively
injecting perturbations in production. In this paper, we propose a
novel design and implementation of a chaos engineering system in
Java called CHAOSMACHINE. It provides a unique and actionable
analysis on exception-handling capabilities in production, at the
level of try-catch blocks. To evaluate our approach, we have
deployed CHAOSMACHINE on top of 3 large-scale and well-known
Java applications totaling 630k lines of code. Our results show
that CHAOSMACHINE reveals both strengths and weaknesses of
the resilience code of a software system at the level of exception
handling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chaos engineering is a new field that consists in injecting
faults in production systems to assess the resilience of a
software system [6]. The core idea of chaos engineering is
active probing: the chaos engineering system actively injects
a controlled perturbation into the production system and
observes the impact of the perturbation as well as the reaction
of the system under study [2], [10], [17]. This aids developers
in gaining confidence in the resilience of their system, and can
help them to find weaknesses in error handling and disaster
recovery routines [3], [6].
Chaos engineering is complementary to static analysis and
testing, as it also 1) generates new knowledge about the system
under study and 2) identifies strengths and weaknesses. Unlike
static analysis and testing, chaos engineering directly acts and
observes the system in production [15], [21]. An example
of chaos engineering system is Netflix ChaosMonkey, which
randomly shuts down servers to make sure that the overall
system is capable of spawning new ones automatically.
In this paper, we present the design and implementation of
a novel chaos engineering system called CHAOSMACHINE. Its
core novelty and uniqueness is that it considers error-handling
capabilities at the fine-grain level of programming language
exceptions. While bad exception-handling is known to be the
cause of up to 92% of critical failures [31], it remains to
be done to apply the chaos engineering vision to exception-
handling. The contribution of this paper is CHAOSMACHINE,
which is capable of revealing the resilience strengths and
weaknesses for every try-catch block executed in production.
CHAOSMACHINE is designed around three components. For
each service of the system under study, there is a monitoring
sidecar (component #1) and a perturbation injector (component
#2) attached to it. The monitoring sidecar is responsible for
collecting all information needed for the resilience analysis,
and the perturbation injector is able to throw a specific
exception at runtime. Component #3 is the chaos controller,
which controls all the perturbation injectors and analyzes the
information collected by every monitoring sidecar. Eventually,
the chaos controller produces a report that gives developers
unique and actionable knowledge about the resilience of their
system.
We evaluate CHAOSMACHINE by applying it to 3 large-
scale and well-known open-source Java applications in the
domains of file-sharing, content-management system and e-
commerce. All the experiments are conducted in a production-
ready environment with end-user level workload. The re-
sults show that CHAOSMACHINE is capable of analyzing
the resilience of 339 try-catch blocks located in 212 Java
classes. CHAOSMACHINE successfully identifies the strongly
resilient try-catch blocks (18/339) that should remain resilient
in subsequent versions. It also identifies the weakest ones,
called silent try-catch blocks (34/339), which are possible
debug nightmares when developers try to understand failures
happening in production.
To sum up, our main contributions are the following.
• The conceptual foundations of chaos engineering in the
context of exception-handling in Java: 1) the definition
of four categories of try-catch blocks according to their
resilience characteristics; 2) a systematic procedure based
on fault injection to assess resilience of try-catch blocks.
• A novel system, called CHAOSMACHINE, that assesses
exception-handling capabilities in production. CHAOS-
MACHINE is based on bytecode instrumentation and
remote control of fine-grained fault injection. It pro-
vides valuable and actionable feedback to the develop-
ers. The system is publicly-available for future research
(https://github.com/KTH/chaos-engineering-research).
• An empirical evaluation of CHAOSMACHINE on 3 real-
world Java systems totaling 630k line of codes, con-
taining 339 try-catch blocks executed by the considered
production traffic. It shows the effectiveness of CHAOS-
MACHINE to reveal both strengths and weaknesses of
a software system’s resilience at the exception-handling
level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the background, Section III and Section IV describes
the design and evaluation of CHAOSMACHINE. Section V and
Section VI discusses the literature and future work.
II. BACKGROUND ON CHAOS ENGINEERING
In this section, we give some background on chaos engi-
neering [6] for readers who are not familiar with the concept.
A. Brief Overview
Let us first start with a metaphor: chaos engineering is
vaccination for software. In medicine, people are vaccinated
to prevent particular diseases. Vaccination consists in in-
jecting a potentially dangerous, yet controlled preparation
that resembles a virus, which helps the body strengthen its
immune system against this virus. Chaos engineering is such
a technology in software engineering: it consists in injecting
a potentially dangerous perturbation that resembles a failure
or heavy load, which helps the developers understand and
improve the resilience of their system [23].
Basiri et al.’s seminal paper [6] about chaos engineering tells
us that the main goals of chaos engineering are: 1) to verify er-
ror handling capabilities and resilience in production settings;
2) to learn about error handling behavior in production. The
mantra of chaos engineering is to experiment with the system
in production. To this extent, Schermann et al. [28] consider
chaos engineering as one facet of continuous experimentation.
Let us now discuss a concrete example. Consider two micro-
services interacting with each other to provide a feature.
Those two micro-services have error-handling code to deal
with problems in the communication link. Chaos engineering
on this system would mean injecting perturbation in the
communication link in production. If the system continues
to provide the expected service under this perturbation, the
developers gain confidence in the error-handling code. If any
perturbation breaks the system’s provided features, it means
that the developers need to fix the error-handling code. This is
the meaning behind the primary idea of chaos engineering:
“experimenting on a distributed system in order to build
confidence in the system’s capability to withstand unexpected
conditions in production” [1].
B. Core Concepts
Chaos engineering is founded on the following concepts.
A perturbation is a change in the application execution
flow, or state, or environment, it is made in a pro-active
and controlled manner. Working with our prior example, one
can inject a timeout into a communication link between two
micro-services. An example of perturbation in the system
environment is when one cuts down the memory available to
the system to see how the application reacts.
A hypothesis is a stipulated relation between a perturba-
tion and some monitored behaviors. In the case of a video
streaming service, one monitored behavior can be the number
of streams started per second. The behaviors of interest can
be caught using a wide range of tools: core business metrics
(number of streams), system-level invariants, execution traces,
environment metrics like I/O usage, etc. For example, a
hypothesis may be: in our web page rendering system, if
one stops the cache (perturbation simulating that the cache
subsystem is broken), the correct content is still delivered to
users (monitored behavior).
An experiment is the process of validating or falsifying
a hypothesis. An experiment includes injecting perturbations
into the system, monitoring how the system reacts and in-
ferring validation and falsification. In the example above, an
experiment for this hypothesis is: 1) to inject an exception
into the page rendering service and 2) to monitor the system’s
reaction. If one still gets the correct output, the experiment
validates the hypothesis, indicating that the error-handling
code works well under such a perturbation. Otherwise, if there
is a difference between the behavior under injection and the
normal behavior, the experiment is considered to have falsified
the hypothesis.
The blast radius defines the impact level of a perturbation.
In practice, it is undesirable that perturbations cause too much
trouble to the service. For example, some perturbations might
cause a long waiting time for some end users. Controlling the
blast radius here would mean to ensure that the waiting time is
not too long, so as not to lose users because of an unacceptable
quality of service.
C. Basic Chaos Methodology
Per [1], there are four main steps to apply chaos engineering
to a system.
The first three steps are related to designing the hypothesis.
First of all, one must find metrics which capture the essential
performance and correctness characteristics of the system’s
steady state. The steady state is characterized by a range of
metric values, with departure from that range meaning the
system should be considered impacted. Secondly, one defines
perturbations which simulate real world possible events, such
as connection timeout, hard drive exhaustion, thread death, etc.
Then one defines two phases: a control phase and an
experimental phase. A control phase is a monitoring period
without perturbation, while the experimental phase is a study
of the system behaviors under perturbation. At the end of these
first three steps, the hypothesis and the experiment design are
set.
Fourth, one performs the actual experiment, consisting of
injecting perturbations into the system and monitoring the
metrics. A report is eventually generated by analyzing the
differences in the effect of the perturbation between the
control phase and experimental phase. There are two possible
outcomes: 1) when a hypothesis is validated, the confidence
in the system resilience capability is improved; 2) when a
hypothesis is falsified, the issue is reported to the development
team, which then has to fix the error-handling code.
D. Concrete Example
Arguably, the most famous chaos engineering system to date
is Netflix’ ChaosMonkey. ChaosMonkey is used to randomly
shutdown systems that are part of a fleet providing a service
in production and to then analyze impact on that system.
Developers at Netflix use the number of video starts per
second as a metric to define system’s steady state [8]. In
this context, 1) an hypothesis is that one instance terminating
abnormally has no influence on the number of served videos;
2) a perturbation is ChaosMonkey shutting down a specific
instance; 3) a chaos experiment is the whole procedure of
applying ChaosMonkey and analyzing the system’s behavior
to validate or falsify the hypothesis.
III. DESIGN OF A CHAOS SYSTEM FOR EXCEPTIONS
This section presents our system for controlled chaos engi-
neering in the Java Virtual Machine, called CHAOSMACHINE.
Its core novelty is that it does chaos engineering at the level of
exception handling and try-catch blocks, which is more fine-
grained than all chaos engineering systems we are aware of.
A. Overview
The goal of CHAOSMACHINE is twofold: 1) falsify hypothe-
ses and 2) discover hypotheses. The former is the classical
goal of chaos engineering systems [6], and the latter is the
key contribution of this paper.
Hypotheses. CHAOSMACHINE considers error-handling hy-
potheses in Java applications. We define the following four
chaos engineering hypotheses at the level of try-catch blocks,
from the most beneficial to the most problematic:
• Resilience hypothesis. A try-catch block is said to be
resilient if the observable behavior of the catch block, ex-
ecuted upon exception, is equivalent to the observable be-
havior of the try-block when no exception happens [11].
Listing 1 presents an example of a try-catch block which
meets resilience hypothesis.
• Observability hypothesis. A try-catch block is said to
be observable if an exception caught in the catch block
results in user-visible effects, see Listing 2.
• Debug hypothesis. A try-catch block is said to be debug-
gable if an exception caught in the catch block results in
an explicit message in the application logs, see Listing 3.
• Silence hypothesis. A try-catch block is said to be silent
if it fails to provide the expected behavior upon exception
while providing no troubleshooting information whatso-
ever, i.e., it is neither observable nor debuggable. If the
silent try-catch block later causes a user-visible failure, it
would be extremely hard for the developers to understand
that the root cause is the silent try-catch block, and to fix
the failure accordingly, see Listing 4.
For each application, these hypotheses need to be refined
with concrete metrics and domain knowledge. For example, for
the resilience hypothesis, the developers would describe what
“behavior equivalence” means in their domain. For instance,
in a web application, receiving an HTTP 200 code with the
same content as the original non-perturbed request may be
considered equivalent.
Listing 1. Try-catch Satisfying the Resilience Hypothesis
1 state = SystemState.A;
2 try {
3 ... // an error is thrown
4 state = SystemState.B;
5 } catch (Exception e) {
6 ... // handles the exception
7 state = SystemState.B;
8 }
9 // After leaving the try-catch, the state
stays the same
Listing 2. Try-catch Satisfying the Observability Hypothesis
1 try {
2 contentsToUsers.add("content A");
3 contentsToUsers.add("content B");
4 } catch (Exception e) {
5 contentsToUsers.add("content C");
6 }
7 render(contentsToUsers);
8 // When exception occurs, contents for users
are different
Listing 3. Try-catch Satisfying the Debug Hypothesis
1 try {
2 ...
3 } catch (Exception e) {
4 ...
5 // Log troubleshooting information
6 Logger.error("...domain specific
information...");
7 }
Listing 4. Try-catch Satisfying the Silence Hypothesis
1 state = SystemState.A;
2 try {
3 state = SystemState.B;
4 contentsToUsers.add("content A");
5 } catch (Exception e) {
6 state = SystemState.C;
7 contentsToUsers.add("content A");
8 // Nothing about the exception is logged
9 }
10 render(contentsToUsers);
11 // Users are not aware of the error, but
system state is different when an
exception occurs, which may lead to other
exceptions.
Experiments. CHAOSMACHINE performs two kinds of
experiments:
• Falsification experiments. They aim at validating or falsi-
fying a hypothesis about the behavior of a try-catch block.
This hypothesis can be stated upfront by developers or
can be discovered through exploration experiments.
• Exploration experiments. They aim at monitoring the
behavior of try-catch blocks under perturbation in order
to discover new hypotheses.
Modes. When CHAOSMACHINE performs exploration ex-
periments, it is said to be in exploration mode. When CHAOS-
MACHINE performs falsification experiments, it is in falsifica-
tion mode. Finally, when CHAOSMACHINE does not introduce
chaos, it is simply in observation mode.
B. Input to ChaosMachine
CHAOSMACHINE works on arbitrary software written in
Java, no manual change is required in the code. To use
CHAOSMACHINE, the application is deployed in production
as usual, CHAOSMACHINE is attached to it in an automated
manner, in observation mode by default. Optionally, devel-
opers can also feed CHAOSMACHINE with manually-written
hypotheses.
C. Architecture of ChaosMachine
Figure 1 presents the main components of CHAOSMA-
CHINE and their interactions. CHAOSMACHINE is meant to be
deployed on any modern Internet application, such as search
engines or transaction systems. Those applications typically
are distributed over several different servers, where the servers
either provide different services (as shown in the figure with
three different services), or provide redundancy and elasticity
for the same service. Per the best practices, and without loss
of generality, all services are considered deployed in separate
virtual machines for the sake of isolation.
CHAOSMACHINE attaches a monitoring sidecar and a per-
turbation injector into each service. The monitoring sidecar
(Section III-C1) collects information to study the outcome of
chaos experiments. The perturbation injector (Section III-C2)
is responsible for injecting perturbations according to a given
perturbation model. The chaos controller (Section III-C3) is a
standalone component that is separated from the application
services, and it has three responsibilities: 1) controlling the
behavior of perturbation injectors; 2) aggregating monitoring
information from each monitoring sidecar; 3) generating a
report for the developers about the quality of error-handling
in their code, which contains novel and actionable feedback
about error-handling in production. We further describe these
outputs in Section III-D.
1) Monitoring Sidecars: Chaos engineering consists of
studying the influence of perturbations on the system behavior,
as captured by metrics [1]. Example metrics include the
number of streamed videos for Netflix and the HTTP response
code for web applications. These metrics are part of evaluation
of whether the system can provide acceptable services, even
under perturbation. The main role of the monitoring sidecars
is to collect these metrics at runtime.
In order to gather sufficient information about error-
handling in Java applications, CHAOSMACHINE uses the fol-
lowing monitoring scheme. For each try-catch block found in
code as it is loaded into the JVM, it notes: 1) their position in
the code, 2) the type of the caught exception, 3) the number
of executions (both in observation mode and in exploration
mode), 4) whether exceptions are recorded in application logs.
Monitoring sidecars also collect the following generic met-
rics:
• The classes that have been loaded so far into the JVM.
• CHAOSMACHINE’s logs, which include information
about when and where an injection has happened, to-
gether with the corresponding stacktrace.
• The exit status, i.e., whether a service has exited normally
or not (crash).
• A set of operating system metrics including CPU usage,
memory usage, and peak thread number.
• The application logs.
2) Perturbation Injectors: The main responsibility of a
perturbation injector is to generate a specific perturbation when
the chaos controller sends the corresponding command, i.e.,
throwing an exception at the beginning of a try-catch block,
resulting in short-circuiting the try-block. An injector is added
to every try-block, using automated code instrumentation.
Each injector can be activated (in exploration mode or in
falsification mode) and deactivated individually.
As argued in [11], injecting the exception at the beginning
of a try-block has two key advantages. First, it drastically
reduces the injection space, since there is only one possible
injection location per try-block. Second, it simulates the worst-
case type of exception where none of the intended effects of
the try-block have been performed. Note that the injectors in
CHAOSMACHINE can be overridden, for example, to allow
developers to throw the exception just before the statement(s)
that could throw that exception.
Listing 5. The Application Code is Automatically Transformed for Injecting
Perturbations
1 try {
2 // injection point #1, type: Exception1
3 if (perturbationInjector1.isActive()) {
4 throw new Exception1();
5 }
6 if (perturbationInjector2.isActive()) {
7 throw new Exception3();
8 }
9 ...original code...
10 } catch (Exception1 e1) {
11 ...original code...
12 try {
13 if (perturbationInjector3.isActive()) {
14 throw new Exception2();
15 }
16 ...original code...
17 } catch (Exception2 e2) {
18 ...original code...
19 }
20 } catch (Exception3 e3) {
21 ...original code...
22 }
Listing 5 gives an example about how this perturbation
injector works. There are two try-blocks in this code snippet,
Exception1 and Exception3 might happen in the first try
block during the execution of the omitted code at line 9,
and Exception2 might happen in the second try block at line
16. Consequently, there are three injection points in total,
corresponding to each caught exception type. When an injector
is activated in exploration or falsification mode, it throws
the corresponding exception. Each injector can be controlled
separately.
3) Chaos Controller: The chaos controller has two goals:
1) discover new hypotheses and 2) falsify existing hypotheses.
a) Hypothesis discovery: Hypothesis discovery consists
of proactively analyzing every executed try-catch block. To do
so, the chaos controller iterates over them one after the other,
to activate the corresponding perturbation injector, and then
analyzes all output as captured by the monitoring sidecars. If
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Fig. 1. The components of CHAOSMACHINE
TABLE I
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE 3 COMPONENTS AND THE 3 MODES OF CHAOSMACHINE
Observation Mode Exploration Mode Falsification Mode
Monitoring Sidecar Monitors all the relevant execution in-
formation
Monitors how the system reacts accord-
ing to a perturbation
Monitors whether an hypothesis is fal-
sified
Perturbation Injector Not active Injects a specific perturbation Injects a specific perturbation
Chaos Controller Deactivate all the perturbation injectors
to keep the system running as usual
Controls perturbation injectors to con-
duct a sequence of chaos experiments
so as to discover new hypotheses
Controls perturbation injectors accord-
ing to a specific hypothesis
the discovered hypothesis is considered as acceptable by the
developers, the new hypothesis is saved permanently, so that
CHAOSMACHINE could conduct falsification experiments on
it later on.
b) Hypothesis falsification: To falsify a hypothesis, the
chaos controller activates the specific perturbation injector
which corresponds to the try-catch block in the hypothesis. For
example, it only activates the injector of the try-catch block
on line 42 of Foo.java, and keeps it activated for 10 seconds.
Then, the controller analyzes the information recorded by the
monitoring sidecars and reports whether the injected perturba-
tion has broken the hypothesis under consideration.
The chaos controller is also responsible for containing the
blast radius. It decides how many perturbation injectors are
active concurrently, as well as how long the perturbation
injectors are active. The roles of the above three components
in different modes are shown in Table I.
D. Output for the developer
CHAOSMACHINE produces a report for the developer, con-
taining the hypotheses validated or falsified for each try-catch
block, sorted according to their criticality. This provides devel-
opers with an overview of the resilience of their system. Silent
catch blocks are usually the ones that require the most urgent
attention, as they hurt the resilience and/or debuggability of the
system. Resilient catch blocks help the resilience, by keeping
the system running even when certain exceptions happen.
E. Implementation
CHAOSMACHINE is written in Java in 2.1k lines of code.
Both the monitoring sidecars and the perturbation injectors are
woven into the application services using a JVM agent [14].
The agent adds the monitoring and injection code using
binary code transformation with the ASM library 1. The
chaos controller is a standalone service communicating with
the monitoring sidecars and the injectors using sockets. For
sake of open-science, the code is made publicly available at
https://github.com/KTH/chaos-engineering-research.
IV. EVALUATION
In our evaluation, we apply CHAOSMACHINE to 3 different
real-world Java projects, including TTorrent (a peer-to-peer file
downloading tool based on the BitTorrent protocol), BroadLeaf
(a web-based commercial system) and X-Wiki (a web-based
wiki system). Following the chaos engineering principles, all
applications are set up in a production environment. In the
following, we present the protocol, experimental results, case
studies, and discussions for each project.
All the experiments rely on the same basic principles: 1) the
chaos controller evaluates try-catch blocks one by one in the
loading order of classes, 2) it only activates one perturbation
injector at a time and 3) the activation duration for every
injector is identical for all tasks. Once the application is set
up, CHAOSMACHINE verifies and evaluates try-catch blocks
following the procedure described in Section III-A.
A. Evaluation on TTorrent
1) Overview of the BitTorrent protocol: BitTorrent is a
peer-to-peer data transfer protocol, which is widely used to
1See http://asm.ow2.org
download files over the Internet. The core concept of the
BitTorrent protocol is that users who want to download a file
also serve to other users the file parts that they have already
downloaded. There are 4 parts in a typical file transfer scenario
with the BitTorrent protocol: 1) a torrent file which includes
information about the shared files and the tracker servers; 2)
several tracker servers which receive client registrations and
announce resource information to new clients; 3) clients who
want to download files, and then get the torrent files and
register their download status with the tracker server; 4) clients
who have already downloaded files and provide pieces of the
files to others (called the “seeders”).
2) Experiment protocol: In this experiment, we consider
the Bittorrent client called TTorrent (version 1.5), written in
Java. It is built as a .jar file and can be used on the command
line. We attach CHAOSMACHINE to this client, and then
use it to download ubuntu-14.04.5-server-i386.iso, a Linux
distribution installer of 623.9MB from the Canonical company.
This means that we use tracker servers from somewhere else
in the Internet, and use many seeders that are providing pieces
of the downloaded file.
First, we classify try-catch blocks in TTorrent by refining the
four hypotheses discussed in Section III-A with the combining
monitoring metrics specific to this application domain.
• Resilient try-catch block. Despite injected exceptions in
this block, the client successfully downloads the file and
exits normally. The chaos controller also detects some er-
ror messages in the application log. Even though there is
an exception thrown at the very beginning of the try-catch
block, the application still fulfills the user’s requirement
correctly. This kind of try-catch block contributes to the
application’s resilience, as the application still supports
the users’ requests even though the entire logic of the
try-block has been discarded.
• Observable try-catch block. A try-catch block is said
observable if the client directly crashes or exits with an
error message under perturbations, i.e., the perturbation
in this try-catch block causes user-visible behaviors of
the client.
• Debuggable try-catch block. A try-catch block is said
debuggable if the system metrics become abnormal or
the exception information is captured in application logs
when an exception is injected. The information is use-
ful for developers to debug and improve the system’s
resilience.
• Silent try-catch block. When an exception occurs in this
block, the client does not download the file and just keeps
running indefinitely. Worse still, there is not any error
information about the injected error. This is a bad case for
both users and developers: users are not made aware that
the download is stalled and developers have no feedback
whatsoever about the problem. Developers can improve
them so as to be able to detect and debug such a problem
if it happens naturally in production.
Then, in an initial observation mode, the client downloads
the full file once until successful completion. During this
phase, CHAOSMACHINE analyzes the client’s behavior.
Next, for the covered try-catch blocks, CHAOSMACHINE
executes the procedure defined in Section III-A while re-
downloading the file, and gathers the data shown in Table II.
In exploration mode, the perturbed clients might not be able
to exit normally, so CHAOSMACHINE keeps the client alive
for at most 300 seconds. After this delay, the client is killed
and information is logged indicating that the client was killed
after this timeout.
3) Experimental results: Table II reads as follows: there are
27 try-blocks covered by the production traffic, i.e., the code
in the try-blocks is executed while the client is downloading
the file. Each row contains the information of one try-block.
The first column is the basic information about each try-
catch block, including the class and method names, caught
exception type and a number which is used to identify different
catch blocks when there is more than one catch block for
a single try-block. The second column records the number
of executions, in both the observation mode and exploration
mode. The third column indicates whether the developers have
logged the exception in their application logs when such an
exception is caught. The forth column shows whether the
client has successfully downloaded the file when exceptions
are injected in this try-block. The fifth column records the
client’s exit status. The sixth column indicates differences in
system metrics (if any) between the observation mode and the
exploration mode. Finally, the last four columns indicate how
this try-catch block meets our pre-defined four hypotheses.
Since injected exceptions change the execution flow of the
application, the number of executions in analysis mode and
exploration mode are not necessarily the same.
Take the first row as an example, it shows that there
is a try-catch block in the getBytes method inside the
BEValue class, which handles a ClassCastException.
Through the entire process of downloading the file, it is
executed 41 times. When the perturbation injector throws a
ClassCastException exception at the beginning of the
try-block, the client does not download the file and crashes.
The chaos controller also detects that a specific error message
is logged in the application log before its crash. Based on
these behaviors, this try-catch block validates the observability
hypothesis (OH) and debug hypothesis (DH).
In total, there are 27 try-catch blocks covered by this file-
download operation in production. Some of them are executed
only once, others up to 90805 times (cf. Column Execution
Anal. of Table II). This information is very important for the
developer. Thanks to CHAOSMACHINE, the developer is able
to identify: 6 resilient try-catch blocks, 7 observable try-catch
blocks, 20 debuggable try-catch blocks, and 3 silent try-catch
blocks.
4) Case studies: In the following we detail 4 case studies.
Listing 6. ClassCastException in BEValue/getBytes
1 public byte[] getBytes() throws
InvalidBEncodingException {
2 try {
3 return (byte[])this.value;
TABLE II
THE RESULTS OF CHAOS EXPERIMENTATIONWITH EXCEPTION INJECTION ON 27 TRY-CATCH BLOCKS IN THE TTORRENT BITTORRENT CLIENT
Try-catch block information Execution
Obse./Expl.
Log. Downl. Exit status Sys. metrics RH OH DH SH
BEValue/getBytes,ClassCastException,0 41 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
BEValue/getNumber,ClassCastException,0 15 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
BEValue/getString,ClassCastException,0 37 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
BEValue/getString,UnsupportedEncodingException,1 37 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
ClientMain/main,CmdLineParser$OptionException,0 1 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
ClientMain/main,Exception,1 1 / 1 yes no crashed - x x
Announce/run,AnnounceException,0 1 / 60 yes no stalled - x x
Announce/run,InterruptedException,2 1 / 760 no yes normally threads+ x
Announce/run,InterruptedException,3 1 / 1 no yes normally no diff x
Announce/run,AnnounceException,4 1 / 1 yes yes normally no diff x x
Announce/stop,InterruptedException,0 1 / 1 no yes normally no diff x
ConnectionHandler/run,SocketTimeoutException,0 1290 /
1030
no yes normally no diff x
ConnectionHandler/run,IOException,1 1290 / 1 yes yes stalled cpu+ x
ConnectionHandler/run,InterruptedException,2 1290 / 2 yes no stalled no diff x
ConnectionHandler/stop,InterruptedException,0 1 / 1 no yes normally no diff x
ConnectionHandler$ConnectorTask/run,Exception,0 50 / 50 yes no stalled no diff x
Handshake/craft,UnsupportedEncodingException,0 50 / 48 yes no stalled no diff x
PeerExchange/send,InterruptedException,0 90763 /
210
no no stalled no diff x
PeerExchange/stop,InterruptedException,0 46 / 44 no yes normally no diff x
PeerExchange$OutgoingThread/run,InterruptedException,0 90805 /
32984841
no no stalled cpu+ x x
PeerExchange$OutgoingThread/run,InterruptedException,1 90763 /
288
no no stalled no diff x
PeerExchange$OutgoingThread/run,IOException,2 90805 / 43 yes no stalled no diff x
PeerExchange$OutgoingThread/run,IOException,3 90763 / 46 yes no stalled no diff x
Piece/validate,NoSuchAlgorithmException,0 2564 /
5427
yes no stalled cpu+ x
HTTPAnnounceRespMessage/parse,InvalidBEncodingException,0 3 / 30 yes no stalled no diff x
HTTPAnnounceRespMessage/parse,InvalidBEncodingException,1 3 / 30 yes no stalled no diff x
HTTPAnnounceResponseMessage/parse,UnknownHostException,2 3 / 30 yes no stalled no diff x
total: 27 / 52 460626 /
32992950
18 8 7 4 6 7 20 3
4 } catch (ClassCastException cce) {
5 throw new InvalidBEncodingException(cce.
toString());
6 }
7 }
Listing 6 shows a part of the getBytes method, con-
taining a single try-catch statement. This try-catch statement
is executed 41 times. When perturbed with an exception
injection, the chaos controller verifies that two core hypotheses
are validated in production: the exception is logged, and the
client exits with an error status. The developer has no further
action to take because this try catch is both observable and
debuggable.
Listing 7. InterruptedException in Announce/run
1 while (!this.stop) {
2 ...
3 try {
4 Thread.sleep(this.interval * 1000);
5 } catch (InterruptedException ie) {
6 // Ignore
7 }
8 }
Listing 7 shows the run method in class Announce. The
try-block is a piece of code running in a sub-thread. The an-
nounce thread starts by making the initial “started” announce
request to register on the tracker and get an interval value. In
the observation mode, the try-catch block is executed once.
However in the exploration mode with exception injection,
the try-catch block is executed 760 times. Indeed, due to the
skip of the Thread.sleep, the while loop runs more times
before reaching its objective. When the perturbation injector
injects the exception, the catch-block simply “swallows” this
exception and does not do anything to handle the exception.
This results in using more computing resources. As shown
in the comment, the developer knows about this behavior.
However, thanks to CHAOSMACHINE, she is made aware that
ignoring the exception is not good for performance, and she is
even given a quantitative measurement (per the system metrics
collected by the monitoring sidecar).
Listing 8. AnnounceException in Announce/run
1 if (!this.forceStop) {
2 ...
3 try {
4 this.getCurrentTrackerClient().announce(
event, true);
5 } catch (AnnounceException ae) {
6 logger.warn(ae.getMessage());
7 }
8 }
Listing 8 is also from the run method in the Announce
class. The exception type is AnnounceException and this
try-catch block is executed once in the observation mode, and
once in the exploration mode. When the perturbation injector
injects the exception, the file is still correctly downloaded.
Once the client finishes the download, it exits with a normal
exit code, and some error messages about this exception
appear in the application log. In this case, the try-catch block
successfully blocks AnnounceException to break the system.
Even though there is only a logging action in the catch
block, our manual analysis has revealed that developers have
built the resilience mechanism outside this particular catch
block. Thanks to CHAOSMACHINE, the developer has gained
confidence in this specific catch block’s exception-handling
capability.
Listing 9. InterruptedException in PeerExchange/send
1 public void send(PeerMessage message) {
2 try {
3 this.sendQueue.put(message);
4 } catch (InterruptedException ie) {
5 // Ignore, our send queue will only
block if it contains
6 // MAX_INTEGER messages, in which case
we’re already in big
7 // trouble, and we’d have to be
interrupted, too.
8 }
9 }
Listing 9 shows method send in class PeerExchange.
It is executed 90’763 times in the observation mode and
210 times in the exploration mode. In this case, when the
perturbation injector injects an InterruptedException,
the client just keeps running until some external entity (the
user or CHAOSMACHINE) kills the process. No information
is logged in the application logs. This means that, when this
exception happens naturally, users have absolutely no debug
information to give to developers. Here, CHAOSMACHINE
helps the developer to identify “nightmare” debug cases of the
form of purely silent try-catch blocks. Based on CHAOSMA-
CHINE report, the developer is urged to change the exception-
handling behavior.
5) Falsification on next version: It is of utmost importance
that the resilience capabilities do not degrade over time. We
try to falsify all hypothesis in a version of TTorrent (1.6) that
is subsequent to the analyzed one, with the same protocol.
The result is that no hypothesis discovered on version 1.5
are falsified on version 1.6, which means that the resilient
try-catch blocks are still capable of handling unanticipated
exceptions and keeping the system steady.
Main result of the TTorrent experiment
In a real-world production usage, CHAOSMACHINE
identifies 6 resilient try-catch blocks and 3 silent ones
in the TTorrent client. Each silent try-catch block in-
dicates a potential debug case that would be extremely
difficult to fix (no visible behavior, no log can be pro-
vided by the user). CHAOSMACHINE precisely detects
those silent try-catch blocks and reports them to the
developer. In subsequent versions, CHAOSMACHINE
verifies that the 6 resilient try-catch blocks remains
resilient thanks to falsification experiments.
B. Evaluation on XWiki
1) Introduction of XWiki: XWiki is a widely-used open-
source wiki system developed in Java, and is active over the
past 14 years. XWiki requires external dependencies like a
database server and a web application server.
2) Experiment protocol: We use a full-fledged produc-
tion setup of XWiki version 9.11.1, which is deployed into
Tomcat-8.5.29 and configured to connect to a MySQL server.
We collect end-user traffic performed through a web browser:
1) visit pages, 2) log in with a username and a password,
3) add some comments on the main page and on a specific
user page, 4) update personal page information and 5) log out.
We record every HTTP user request, as well as the associated
HTTP responses (including response code, header and body).
This end-user traffic is replayed on the production system to
perform each experiment, per the chaos engineering practices
observed in previous work [26]. First, CHAOSMACHINE runs
the observation mode to monitor all the dynamic try-catch
information and the normal behavior without any perturbation.
Then, an exploration mode is activated. CHAOSMACHINE
activates the corresponding perturbation injector for each cov-
ered try-catch block. The injector is active for 1 minute and
CHAOSMACHINE collects the HTTP responses, which are then
compared to those collected in observation mode.
In XWiki’s experiment, we define the four classes of try-
catch blocks as following:
• Resilient try-catch block. Despite injected exceptions in
this block, users still get the expected response content
or succeed in adding comments and updating personal
profile.
• Observable try-catch block. A try-catch block is said
observable if the response code changes from “200 OK”
to others. Consequently users also get an error page or
request redirection under the corresponding exceptions.
• Debuggable try-catch block. A try-catch block is said
debuggable if the the exception information is captured
in application logs when an exception is injected.
• Silent try-catch block. A silent try-catch block only causes
response body change while the response code stays the
same as usual, and there is no error information about
the injected exception in application logs.
3) Experimental results: There are 290 user requests we
recorded: 276 GET requests and 14 POST ones. This traffic
contains: 97 GET requests directly on downloading resources,
178 GET requests and 10 POST requests on rendering pages,
4 POST requests on logging in, adding comments, updating
user data, and 1 GET request on logging out.
In total, 1567 try-catch blocks are registered in CHAOS-
MACHINE, and 268 of them are covered by the traffic we
recorded. Table III summarizes the data aggregated over pack-
ages. The first column is the abbreviated package name. The
second column shows the number of try-catch blocks that are
covered by the production traffic. The third column is the total
number of try-catch block executions in both the observation
mode and exploration mode. Finally, the last four columns
indicate the number of try-catch blocks which meet our pre-
defined four hypotheses described in Section III-A, including:
7 resilient try-catch blocks, 33 observable try-catch blocks, 233
debuggable try-catch blocks, and 23 silent try-catch blocks.
TABLE III
RESULTS ON CHAOS EXPERIMENTATION ON 268 TRY-CATCH BLOCKS IN
XWIKI COVERED BY THE CONSIDERED WORKLOAD
Packages Covered Executions in
Obse. / Expl.
RH OH DH SH
org/xwiki/a* 1 273 / 273 0 0 1 0
org/xwiki/c* 20 112968 / 119544 0 6 20 0
org/xwiki/d* 2 855 / 1398 0 0 2 0
org/xwiki/e* 11 20882 / 99204 0 1 11 0
org/xwiki/f* 23 44813 / 222 0 0 23 0
org/xwiki/i* 8 1142 / 280 0 0 8 0
org/xwiki/l* 12 295530 / 73048 0 1 12 0
org/xwiki/m* 9 38360 / 37739 0 1 9 0
org/xwiki/n* 10 62 / 190837 0 0 8 2
org/xwiki/o* 2 43753 / 68154 0 0 2 0
org/xwiki/p* 4 5403 / 3075 0 0 4 0
org/xwiki/q* 3 262 / 142 0 0 3 0
org/xwiki/r* 93 1137420 /
272944
5 7 70 14
org/xwiki/s* 15 20522 / 31826 2 5 15 0
org/xwiki/t* 2 83 / 81 0 0 2 0
org/xwiki/u* 20 13795 / 6229 0 8 16 1
org/xwiki/v* 5 3201 / 831 0 2 5 0
org/xwiki/w* 21 2526 / 3140 0 2 16 5
org/xwiki/x* 7 890 / 580 0 0 6 1
Total 268/1567 1742740 /
909547
7 33 233 23
Take the row “org/xwiki/s*” as an example. For all the
try-catch blocks in the package whose name begins with
org/xwiki/s, there are 15 try-catch blocks covered by this
set of chaos experiments. Under normal conditions, these 15
try-catch blocks are executed 20522 times. When CHAOS-
MACHINE activates the corresponding perturbation injectors
in these try-catch blocks, the same blocks are executed 31826
times in total. After classification by CHAOSMACHINE, the de-
veloper knows that: 1) 2 try-catch blocks satisfy the resilience
hypothesis, 2) 5 try-catch blocks satisfy the observable hypoth-
esis, 3) 15 try-catch blocks satisfy the debug hypothesis and
4) none of the try-catch blocks satisfy the silence hypothesis.
With the help of this report, developers gain more knowl-
edge on XWiki’s error-handling capabilities in production.
They are also encouraged to take action: 1) go over the silent
try-catch blocks to confirm whether they need to record more
information when an exception occurs and 2) focus on the try-
catch blocks which have serious impact on system’s steady
state, i.e. the observable ones. For example, if there is an
exception in a specific try block, which leads to the system
to generate an 500 response code instead of 200. As a result,
the response contents also change to an error page for users.
The chaos experiment provides more clues for developers to
review the try-catch block and help them improve the fault
tolerance ability.
4) Case studies: In the following, we detail two interesting
cases found in the XWiki experiment.
Listing 10. XWikiException in XWikiCachingRightService/authenticateUser
1 try {
2 XWikiUser user = context.getWiki().
checkAuth(context);
3 if (user != null) {
4 userReference = resolveUserName(user.
getUser(), new WikiReference(context
.getWikiId()));
5 }
6 } catch (XWikiException e) {
7 LOGGER.error("Caught exception while
authenticating user.", e);
8 }
Listing 10 shows part of method authenticateUser in
class XWikiCachingRightService. There is only one
try-catch block in this method. It is executed 151 times in
observation mode and 153 times with perturbation. When the
exception occurs, this catch block logs the error information.
According to the monitored behavior, this perturbation actually
has a visible impact on certain requests: it leads to an HTTP
response code 302 (Redirect) instead of 200. Per our definition,
this try-catch block satisfies both the observability and the
debug hypothesis.
Listing 11. InterruptedException in DefaultSolrIndexer $Resolver/runInt-
ernal
1 try {
2 queueEntry = resolveQueue.take();
3 } catch (InterruptedException e) {
4 logger.warn("The SOLR resolve thread has
been interrupted", e);
5 queueEntry = RESOLVE_QUEUE_ENTRY_STOP;
6 }
7
8 if (queueEntry == RESOLVE_QUEUE_ENTRY_STOP) {
9 // Stop the index thread: clear the queue
and send the stop signal without
blocking.
10 indexQueue.clear();
11 indexQueue.offer(INDEX_QUEUE_ENTRY_STOP);
12 break;
13 }
Listing 11 shows part of method runInternal in class
DefaultSolrIndexer’s private inner class Resolver.
This try block is executed 11 times in observation mode and is
executed only once with perturbation. CHAOSMACHINE iden-
tifies that this perturbation does not influence the output of any
request. The monitoring sidecar also detects that the exception
is caught in the application log. As we can see from the source
code, developers log the exception information and also assign
queueEntry to RESOLVE_QUEUE_ENTRY_STOP in the
catch block which is a valid error-handling strategy in this
context. Through the chaos experiment, the developers gain
more confidence that this exception-handling design actually
works in production.
Main result of the XWiki experiment
CHAOSMACHINE analyzes 268 try-catch blocks and
identifies 7 that satisfy the resilience hypothesis, and
23 try-catch blocks that are silent, violating the silence
hypothesis. This experiment shows that our prototype
implementation of CHAOSMACHINE scales to a system
with 440k LOC and 1567 try-catch blocks loaded in
the JVM.
C. Evaluation on Broadleaf
1) Introduction of Broadleaf: Broadleaf Commerce is a
series of open-source products in an eCommerce platform
TABLE IV
RESULTS ON CHAOS EXPERIMENTATION ON 44 TRY-CATCH BLOCKS IN
BROADLEAF COVERED BY THE CONSIDERED WORKLOAD
Packages Covered Executions in
Obse. / Expl.
RH OH DH SH
o/b/cms/file* 1 53 / 50 0 1 1 0
o/b/cms/url* 3 288 / 111 2 0 0 1
o/b/com*/audit* 2 40 / 13 0 0 1 1
o/b/com*/classloader* 2 1596 / 849 0 2 2 0
o/b/com*/i18n* 1 10660 / 51 0 1 1 0
o/b/com*/persistence* 1 24 / 2 0 0 1 0
o/b/com*/security* 2 14 / 40 0 1 2 0
o/b/com*/util* 1 30 / 21 0 1 1 0
o/b/com*/web* 4 188 / 60 0 2 3 1
o/b/core/catalog* 1 2 / 2 0 0 0 1
o/b/core/order* 5 34 / 84 0 3 5 0
o/b/core/payment* 1 1 / 1 1 0 0 0
o/b/core/pricing* 1 5 / 21 0 1 1 0
o/b/core/rating* 2 6 / 6 0 0 2 0
o/b/core/search* 2 44 / 38 0 2 2 0
o/b/core/web* 10 615 / 340 1 5 7 2
o/b/ope*/audit* 3 16 / 14 0 1 1 2
o/b/profile/core* 1 3 / 2 1 0 0 0
o/b/vendor/sample* 1 1 / 1 0 1 1 0
Total 44/355 13620 / 1706 5 21 31 8
written in Java. There are three components in Broadleaf
which can be deployed separately into different servers:
administration website, end-user shopping website and data
fetching APIs.
2) Experiment protocol: We choose to conduct chaos ex-
periments on Broadleaf version 5.0.0-GA. It provides an
embedded Tomcat server, a HyperSQL database and a startup
script, which simplifies deployment. For this experiment, we
focus on the end-user shopping website. Similar to the exper-
iments on XWiki, we deploy Broadleaf and randomly interact
with the website system, including: 1) visiting product pages,
2) logging in with a username and a password, 3) adding
products to a shopping cart, 4) checking out, and 5) logging
out. As before, we record every user request and its associated
response. In this experiment, we define resilient, observable,
debuggable, silent try-catch block as per the XWiki experiment
in Section IV-B2, since they are both web systems with the
same core characteristics.
3) Experimental results: The recorded operations include
384 requests in total. There are 362 requests responsible for
directly downloading files, all of which are GET requests.
There are 15 GET requests about rendering pages. All of the 6
functional requests are POST, including logging in, updating
the shopping cart, and checking out. The request for logging
out is a request of type GET. These requests are replayed by
GoReplay all the time during the experiments, and the time
to finish this sequence of operations is less than 90 seconds.
First, CHAOSMACHINE keeps a 90 seconds observation mode
to gather the system’s normal behaviors. At the same time, it
also obtains information about covered try-catch blocks. Then,
for each covered try-catch block, CHAOSMACHINE runs in
exploration mode for 90 seconds. The results are generated
and discussed next.
Table IV summarizes the results. The recorded traffic covers
44 try-catch blocks. In the first step of the experiment, we leave
CHAOSMACHINE running automatically. In this case, it does
not detect any resilient try-catch blocks, which leads us to do
some further analysis. In the second step, we manually analyze
all logs generated by monitoring sidecars. This analysis reveals
that some of the diff-logs are semantically equivalent, but the
monitoring sidecar marks the output as different if it is not the
same (verbatim).
For instance, Broadleaf uses JSON objects to handle the
prices of products with different properties. The price of
an XL-size black T-shirt is $17, which is displayed as
{"options":[1, 14], "price":17}. In the snippet,
number 1 stands for “XL” and number 14 stands for “black”. It
is obvious that {"options":[14, 1], "price":17}
has the same meaning. However, the current implementation
of our monitoring sidecar regards these as different outputs.
This phenomenon reflects one limitation of the monitoring
sidecar: it is not sophisticated enough to determine semantical
equivalence.
Following the manual comparison between the response
bodies, the revised report about try-catch resilience is: 5
resilient try-catch blocks, 21 observable try-catch blocks, 31
debuggable try-catch blocks, and 8 silent try-catch blocks.
4) Case studies: Next, we discuss one of the most inter-
esting cases found in the chaos experiment on Broadleaf.
Listing 12. NoResultException in CountrySubdivisionDaoImpl/findSubdivi-
sionByCountryAndAltAbbreviation
1 public CountrySubdivision
findSubdivisionByCountryAndAltAbbreviation
(...) {
2 TypedQuery<CountrySubdivision> query = new
...
3 try {
4 return query.getSingleResult();
5 } catch (NoResultException e) {
6 return null;
7 }
8 }
As shown in Listing 12, CHAOSMACHINE identifies this
try-catch block as a resilient one. As the method name
suggests, the method is used for obtaining the sub-division
of a country. The method is executed 3 times in observation
mode and 2 times in exploration mode. When the perturbation
injector is activated, the query result is always “null”. The
reason why the response content stays the same is that in
observation mode, the user’s country information does not
contain sub-divisions. Thus, no matter if there is an exception,
the query result remains “null”. However, this try-catch block
may impact the system’s output if a specific user has sub-
division information.
This phenomenon exposes another limitation of CHAOS-
MACHINE. Since it uses production traffic to evaluate the
resilience of try-catch blocks, the traffic might not be sufficient
to give definitive conclusions. For some try-catch blocks that
are currently classified as resilient, different traffic may be
able to falsify the hypotheses. The accuracy of the report of
CHAOSMACHINE can be optimized by inputing more varied
production traffic and analyzing output using more detailed
domain-specific knowledge.
TABLE V
THE OVERHEAD OF AN EXPLORATION EXPERIMENT ON TTORRENT
Evaluation Aspects Original Version Instrumented Version Variation
Downloading time 102.2s 96.4s -6%
CPU time 2288 3410 50%
Memory usage 289M 332M 15%
Peak thread count 119 116 -3%
Class files size 330.Kb 334.Kb 1.3%
5) Discussion of Broadleaf experiment: Through this ex-
periment, we finally succeed in analyzing Broadleaf’s error-
handling resilience capabilities under unanticipated excep-
tions. However, it is necessary to invest more manual work
compared to experiments on XWiki. The limitations of the
monitoring sidecar makes CHAOSMACHINE unable to de-
termine which try-catch blocks really influence the system’s
steady state. In the first step of the experiment, CHAOS-
MACHINE detects 0 resilient try-catch blocks. However, it is
practicable to improve the abilities of the monitoring sidecar
to calculate differences. The variety of production traffic also
limits the identifications performed by CHAOSMACHINE.
Main result of the Broadleaf experiment
CHAOSMACHINE identifies 5 resilient, 8 silent ones,
21 observable ones, and 31 try-catch blocks. This ex-
periment exposes two important facts: (a) the monitor-
ing sidecar may need to embed some domain-specific
knowledge in order to better interpret the application
output and logs, and (b) the length of the captured pro-
duction traffic during chaos experimentation matters.
D. Overhead of the CHAOSMACHINE
Now, we discuss the overhead of the CHAOSMACHINE
in the context of TTorrent. We calculate the overhead of
CHAOSMACHINE in three aspects: 1) at the application level,
by measuring downloading-time increase between the origi-
nal version and the instrumented version, 2) at the system
level, by measuring CPU and memory usage increase, and
3) at the binary code level, by measuring code bloat due to
instrumentation. For statistical purposes, we conduct the same
measurement 5 times and calculate the average number. The
results are presented in Table V.
The instrumentation done by CHAOSMACHINE has little
influence on downloading time, memory usage and file size.
We observe a 50% higher CPU time; this is due to the fact
that CHAOSMACHINE turns on all the monitoring sidecars to
print more information. Note that in falsification mode, when
CHAOSMACHINE focuses on some specific hypotheses, the
overhead of CPU time is significantly reduced to less than 1%.
As a summary, the overhead of chaos experiments on TTorrent
can be considered as compatible with production requirements.
V. RELATED WORK
Chaos engineering is a new field which is little researched,
hence the closely related work is relatively scarce. Beyond
chaos engineering, we discuss here the related yet completely
different areas of fault-injection and error-handling static anal-
ysis.
Fault injection is a well-researched area in the field of
software dependability. It is traditionally applied offline to
evaluate error-handling capabilities. Kanawati et al. [18] pro-
posed FERRARI, a tool for the validation of dependability
properties. Han et al. [16] designed DOCTOR, an integrated
environment for assessing distributed real-time systems, and
Lee et al. [20] proposed SFIDA, a tool to test the dependability
of distributed applications on the Linux platform. All of these
tools are based on injecting hardware-related faults, in a
testing setup. Montrucchio et al. [24], Segal et al. [5], [29],
Arlat et al. [4] also presented similar injection techniques for
simulating hardware faults. Kao et al. [19] invented “FINE”,
a fault injection and monitoring tool to inject both hardware-
induced software errors and software faults. All those systems
are not meant to be used in production, because, in the
literature, fault tolerance analysis is done at design or testing
time. More importantly, it is actually not possible to use
them in production out-of-the-box, either because they require
the source code or because they impose an unacceptable
overhead. On the contrary, CHAOSMACHINE is designed for
fault injection in production in order to give precious insights
of error-handling capabilities in a live setting.
Netflix [10] is well known for its ChaosMonkey, which
randomly shuts down Amazon instances in production. It is
used to ensure that the user experience is not impacted by
a loss of an Amazon instance. This methodology has been
extended to more failure types both at Netflix [17] and other
companies [25]. An example of cloud oriented tool is by
Sheridan et al. [30], who presented a fault injection tool for
cloud applications, where faults are resource stress or service
outage. While those tools conduct chaos experiments between
services at the OS level or the network level, CHAOSMACHINE
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to perform chaos
experiments in a white-box fashion. It perturbs the runtime
status inside the JVM, and enables developers to detect internal
weaknesses at the code level (not the service interaction level).
Now we discuss exception analysis. Alexandre L. Martins
et al. [22] presented VerifyEx to test Java exceptions by
inserting exceptions at the beginning of try blocks. Their
goal is to improve test coverage and not to assess error-
handling contracts as done in CHAOSMACHINE. Byeong-Mo
et al. [9] gave a comprehensive review on exception analysis.
Fu and Ryder [13] described a static analysis method for
exception chains in Java. Magiel Bruntink et al. [7] proposed
a characterization and evaluation method to discover faults
in idiom-based exception handling. Zhang and Elbaum [32]
presented an approach that amplifies test to validate exception
handling. Cornu et al. [11] proposed a classification of try-
catch blocks at testing time. Here, the problem domain and
implementation techniques are different: those authors use
modified source code and test suites to study resilience. On the
contrary, CHAOSMACHINE operates in production with Java
bytecode, using real production traffic to conduct the analysis.
Czeck et al. [12] described a methodology for modeling
fault effects on system behavior. They construct a behavior
model based on a small set of workloads and use the model
to infer the fault behavior of other workloads. In comparison,
CHAOSMACHINE is directly applied to the production system
to make and falsify hypotheses about its resilience. Finally,
chaos engineering relates to failure-oblivious computing [27]:
both are engineering techniques for production failures, yet
failure-oblivious computing is not about the active injection
of faults in the production systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented CHAOSMACHINE, which analyzes
and falsifies exception-handling hypotheses in Java programs
running in production. We showed, on three large applications,
that CHAOSMACHINE is able to produce actionable reports
for developers to gain more confidence about the resilience of
their system, and to point out critical try-catch blocks that
need more attention. In future work, we will improve the
monitoring sidecar to capture more precisely the steady state
of the system. We will also design more advanced perturbation
models, for example by changing the timing of methods
invocation or with finer-grained strategies to control the blast
radius of chaos engineering experiments.
REFERENCES
[1] Principles of chaos engineering. http://principlesofchaos.org/, April
2018.
[2] John Allspaw. Fault injection in production. Queue, 10(8):30:30–30:35,
August 2012.
[3] Peter Alvaro, Kolton Andrus, Chris Sanden, Casey Rosenthal, Ali Basiri,
and Lorin Hochstein. Automating failure testing research at internet
scale. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Symposium on Cloud
Computing, SoCC ’16, pages 17–28, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
[4] Jean Arlat, Martine Aguera, Louis Amat, Yves Crouzet, Jean-Charles
Fabre, Jean-Claude Laprie, Eliane Martins, and David Powell. Fault
injection for dependability validation: A methodology and some appli-
cations. IEEE Trans. Software Eng., 16(2):166–182, 1990.
[5] J. H. Barton, E. W. Czeck, Z. Z. Segall, and D. P. Siewiorek. Fault
injection experiments using fiat. IEEE Transactions on Computers,
39(4):575–582, Apr 1990.
[6] A. Basiri, N. Behnam, R. de Rooij, L. Hochstein, L. Kosewski,
J. Reynolds, and C. Rosenthal. Chaos engineering. IEEE Software,
33(3):35–41, May 2016.
[7] Magiel Bruntink, Arie van Deursen, and Tom Tourwe´. Discovering
faults in idiom-based exception handling. In ICSE, pages 242–251.
ACM, 2006.
[8] Aaron Blohowiak Nora Jones Casey Rosenthal, Lorin Hochstein and
Ali Basiri. Chaos engineering - building confidence in system behavior
through experiments. https://www.oreilly.com/ideas/chaos-engineering,
September 2017.
[9] Byeong-Mo Chang and Kwanghoon Choi. A review on exception
analysis. Information & Software Technology, 77:1–16, 2016.
[10] Michael Alan Chang, Bredan Tschaen, Theophilus Benson, and Laurent
Vanbever. Chaos monkey: Increasing sdn reliability through systematic
network destruction. SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 45(4):371–
372, August 2015.
[11] Benoit Cornu, Lionel Seinturier, and Martin Monperrus. Exception
Handling Analysis and Transformation Using Fault Injection: Study of
Resilience Against Unanticipated Exceptions. Information and Software
Technology, 57:66–76, January 2015.
[12] E. W. Czeck and D. P. Siewiorek. Observations on the effects of
fault manifestation as a function of workload. IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 41(5):559–566, May 1992.
[13] Chen Fu and Barbara G. Ryder. Exception-chain analysis: Revealing ex-
ception handling architecture in java server applications. In Proceedings
of the 29th International Conference on Software Engineering, ICSE ’07,
pages 230–239, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE Computer Society.
[14] Sudipto Ghosh and John L. Kelly. Bytecode fault injection for java
software. J. Syst. Softw., 81(11):2034–2043, November 2008.
[15] Haryadi S. Gunawi, Thanh Do, Joseph M. Hellerstein, Ion Stoica,
Dhruba Borthakur, and Jesse Robbins. Failure as a service (faas):
A cloud service for large-scale, online failure drills. Technical Re-
port UCB/EECS-2011-87, EECS Department, University of California,
Berkeley, Jul 2011.
[16] Seungjae Han, K. G. Shin, and H. A. Rosenberg. Doctor: an integrated
software fault injection environment for distributed real-time systems.
In Proceedings of 1995 IEEE International Computer Performance and
Dependability Symposium, pages 204–213, April 1995.
[17] Yury Izrailevsky and Ariel Tseitlin. The netflix simian army.
http://techblog.netflix.com/2011/07/netflix-simian-army.html, July 2011.
[18] Ghani A. Kanawati, Nasser A. Kanawati, and Jacob A. Abraham.
FERRARI: A tool for the validation of system dependability properties.
In FTCS, pages 336–344. IEEE Computer Society, 1992.
[19] W. I. Kao, R. K. Iyer, and D. Tang. Fine: A fault injection and monitoring
environment for tracing the unix system behavior under faults. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 19(11):1105–1118, Nov 1993.
[20] Hyosoon Lee, Youngshik Song, and Heonshik Shin. Sfida: a software
implemented fault injection tool for distributed dependable applications.
In Proceedings Fourth International Conference/Exhibition on High
Performance Computing in the Asia-Pacific Region, volume 1, pages
410–415 vol.1, May 2000.
[21] Tanakorn Leesatapornwongsa and Haryadi S. Gunawi. The case for
drill-ready cloud computing. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on
Cloud Computing, SOCC ’14, pages 13:1–13:8, New York, NY, USA,
2014. ACM.
[22] Alexandre Locci Martins, Simone Hanazumi, and Ana Cristina Vieira
de Melo. Testing java exceptions: An instrumentation technique. In
COMPSAC Workshops, pages 626–631. IEEE Computer Society, 2014.
[23] Martin Monperrus. Principles of Antifragile Software. In Proceedings
of the Salon des Refuse´s 2017, 2017.
[24] B. Montrucchio, M. Rebaudengo, and A. Velasco. Fault injection in
the process descriptor of a unix-based operating system. In 2014 IEEE
International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and
Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), pages 281–286, Oct 2014.
[25] Heather Nakama. Inside Azure search: Chaos engineering.
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/inside-azure-search-chaos-engineering/,
July 2015.
[26] Kyle Parrish and David Halsey. Too big to test: Breaking a
production brokerage platform without causing financial devastation.
https://conferences.oreilly.com/velocity/devops-web-performance-ny-2015/public/schedule/detail/45012,
October 2015.
[27] M. Rinard, C. Cadar, D. Dumitran, D.M. Roy, T. Leu, and W.S.
Beebee Jr. Enhancing server availability and security through failure-
oblivious computing. In Proceedings of the 6th conference on Sym-
posium on Operating Systems Design & Implementation, pages 21–21.
USENIX Association, 2004.
[28] Gerald Schermann, Ju¨rgen Cito, Philipp Leitner, Uwe Zdun, and Har-
ald C. Gall. We’re doing it live: A multi-method empirical study
on continuous experimentation. Information and Software Technology,
99:41 – 57, 2018.
[29] Z. Segall, D. Vrsalovic, D. Siewiorek, D. Yaskin, J. Kownacki, J. Barton,
R. Dancey, A. Robinson, and T. Lin. Fiat-fault injection based automated
testing environment. In [1988] The Eighteenth International Symposium
on Fault-Tolerant Computing. Digest of Papers, pages 102–107, June
1988.
[30] Craig Sheridan, Darren Whigham, and Matej Artac. DICE fault injection
tool. CoRR, abs/1707.06420, 2017.
[31] Ding Yuan, Yu Luo, Xin Zhuang, Guilherme Renna Rodrigues, Xu Zhao,
Yongle Zhang, Pranay Jain, and Michael Stumm. Simple testing can
prevent most critical failures: An analysis of production failures in
distributed data-intensive systems. In 11th USENIX Symposium on
Operating Systems Design and Implementation, pages 249–265, 2014.
[32] Pingyu Zhang and Sebastian Elbaum. Amplifying tests to validate excep-
tion handling code: An extended study in the mobile application domain.
ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol., 23(4):32:1–32:28, September 2014.
